Many ideas in ethics are getting synthesized in contemporary views, and I would like to share some thoughts on that, concerning Kant’s deontological ethics, and how they might possibly tie into systems like Hume’s, as well as consequential theories, through biological determinism.

I recently read Raw Langton’s, Maria von Herbert’s Challenge to Kant (http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/rhl/maria.html). I was thoroughly impressed. I have heard plenty of criticisms of Kant's ethics having the tendency to reduce people to something like cold, desensitized robots, but never have I seen such a vivid and moving example of that. It was kind of inspiring, in a way.

I think the popular consensus is that Kant's rejection of emotion's role in ethics was unwise, but I haven't really been able to see or say exactly why and how, until now. Of course, popular consensus and emotional response does not establish truth, so this isn’t a criticism in itself—this problem is probably actually the motivation for Kant’s discussion of ethics, or any attempt to establish a solid system determining moral truths for that matter.

I do think there are some inclinations that we'd do better without, but, that’s only because I am looking at inclinations with the end of efficiency and harmony in mind. There are some strong parallels to this in the idea of being moral to join with God, or being moral to transcend nature or worldliness, which is said to be the source of suffering or wickedness. But, I don’t view nature as evil. I rather recognize that the goal of humans to be liberated from suffering is incompatible with nature, including human nature. But, I don’t think that it’s wholly impossible, irrational, or futile. Technology and knowledge, with proper application, has done much to relieve the terrible suffering that other animals endure in nature. I see no reason that if this progress were to extend into the far future that suffering could be greatly diminished, perhaps even virtually eliminated. And, this would require some control and perhaps elimination of our natural drives or inclinations; but, not all of them. The ones that agree with and support efficiency, cooperation, and harmony between people are beneficial to the process. Once again, this is a teleological process—ultimately a utilitarian one. Otherwise, it would serve no purpose, other than self-perpetuation.
Maybe that’s what Kant intended for the Kingdom of Ends, self perpetuation, but—like Langton criticizes—we have to get there first! And, goal accomplishment is conditional; it requires a consequential approach.
I agree with Langton (and others) that nature is indifferent to our individual happiness, suffering, or attempts to reconcile our ideas of ‘good’ as being inherent in nature. 'Indifferent' is probably too anthropomorphic a term to accurately describe it even. Nature encompasses humanity, and giving rise to our reason and our ethics, it engulfs our attempts to separate ethics from it and base it some alternative source or set it up as a standalone system.

The foundation of human ethics itself may very well be an emergent psychological phenomenon in nature that serves a function which is not unique to humans, but just more elegant. But, inclinations and reason both emerge in nature, and serve a function for the organisms in which they emerge.

Kant’s complete rejection of emotion and inclination make his ethics cold and logical. A robot could follow Kant’s ethics; he is like an 18th century Spock. I am sure that’s not a new connection. Maybe Kant even provided some inspiration for the character. I appreciate his ‘good intentions’, but I don’t agree with his complete rejection of inclinations. I think the Kant’s work on establishing a logical basis for ethics (or for anyone to try to establish a logical basis for understanding anything, for that matter), is necessarily based on an inclination to do so, and if this is so, then to reject inclination would be self-defeating. This is, I think, subtly suggested in Nietzsche’s short criticism of Kant in Beyond Good and Evil.
Hume’s ethics are commonly cited as opposed to Kant’s in that they rest on inclinations. He separates matters of fact—propositions describing the natural world and “relations of ideas”, or ‘what is the case’—from matters of emotion or “passions”. I don’t see that Kant really answered or directly criticized Hume’s ideas. Instead he formed a distinct, contrary presentation of morality. But, Hume’s conclusion that moral judgments are not conclusions of reason, and is rather in agreement with the popular view that morality and emotions are deeply intertwined, is from just as cogent an argument as Kant’s, if we overlook the criticism that Kant’s was inclined by his passion to found ethics on reason. But, if Kant’s ethics are fundamentally founded on a passion—as Nietzsche says, “[Kant] want[s] us to understand with [his] morality: ‘What is respectable about me is that I can obey—and things should be no different for you than they are for me.’”—then Kant’s and Hume’s ethics are not wholly incompatible.
Kant’s ethics are counter-intuitive, but I see it as an honest attempts to solve Hume’s ‘is/ought problem’. Hume resolved it by just admitting that moral truths are not really based on absolute truths, and are somewhat subjective. I’ve read criticisms of Hume suggesting he advocated relativism, or some kind of proto-relativism, but I don’t agree with this. Hume definitely says that some “passions” and “principles of taste” are universal. That suggests that there is some kind of universal human moral values on which a system of ethics could rest. If we can determine what these are, and establish them as axioms, it would be a real possibility to develop a system of morality as logical as mathematics, but in also in strict agreement with the common human moral sentiments. And, I think these moral inclinations or “passions” that we share are so intricate and impressionable that they can be affected by reason and beliefs, but so universal that—as Sterba suggests in his introduction to Ethics: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives—if we shared the same background beliefs, we’d most probably always share the same moral judgments.

Suppose this elusive universality really does exist; it would make sense to hypothesize that it arises from, and fundamentally depends on our biological makeup. And, this is something that can be empirically tested, and may eventually be established (or falsified). If this were true, we could definitely synthesize Kant and Hume’s ideas on ethics, and establish Langton’s aphorism, “Inclinations without reasons are blind…, reasons without inclinations are empty.”

Can Metaphysical Systems Establish Real Truths?

Nick Josh Karean: I have no fault to find with those who teach legitimate science. Science is the only method which has not produced sects and denominations. Science is founded on analysis and on synthesis and on the calculus; it does not occupy itself with probable truths and delusional truths; moreover it has the same method of identifying authenticity or the real truth in every nation and in every country.

I wrote this in elaboration of the original quote from the King of Prussia, Frederick the Great (1712 –1786) which sounded like this: "I have no fault with those who teach geometry. That science is the only one which has not produced sects; it is founded on analysis, and on synthesis and on the calculus; it does not occupy itself with probable truths; moreover it has the same method in every country."

James Robert Foster II: "it does not occupy itself with probable truths" All inductive arguments (which includes all scientific arguments) can only establish probable truth.

Nick Josh Karean: Indeed. But the 'probable' truth for the religious does not carry the same definition of the 'probable' truth in science.

James Robert Foster II: The term is ambiguous. But, that does not mean that science does not occupy itself with probable truths. It does. This is all that I can establish. On the other hand, religious 'truth' is largely based off of metaphysical assumptions, and if those assumptions were false, the system and its truths would be false. Science has falsified a lot of the 'truths' that were reached through reasoning based on different metaphysical assumptions, and other assumptions, but unfortunately the metaphysical assumptions that religions rely on are not falsifiable, and persist, despite the progress of science.

Scientific 'truth', or, more accurately, scientific theory gives a best estimate explanation of the real world that is based on reasoning from empirical standards, rather than metaphysical assumptions.

The quote you altered was accurate because mathematics doesn't employ induction at all. It's purely deductive and it's truth's are logically sound, but the truths aren't informative. Saying 2+2 is the same as saying 4, so 2+2 = 4 is about as informative as saying a dog is a dog. Scientific arguments can never have that solid logical soundness, but they can be very informative. Actually, it's this information it provides that causes the conclusions to lose their logical certainty.

The methods really are two separate approaches to the same end—‘truth', with metaphysics taking a "top-down" approach, starting with grand general assumptions, and natural science taking a "bottom-up" approach, starting with small local observations. A lot of people, myself included, attempt to extrapolate from science to metaphysics, and vice versa.

A lot of people also make (or have made) metaphysical assumptions comparable to belief in God, like choosing free-will or determinism, idealism or realism, physicalism or dualism of mind, and about the nature of existence and the nature of space and time.

I don't think science per se is, or can be concerned with falsifying metaphysical assertions. And if the metaphysical assertion(s) in question have real effects in physical/empirical reality, science can only test those effects, and not the assertions themselves. What can't be falsified isn't a problem, anyway. The real problems are the 'truths' about reality inferred from metaphysical assumptions; they beg the question and aren't grounded on verifiable (or falsifiable) principles or observations.

A lot of religious people try to apply a similar criticism to scientific theory, but they ignore that scientific theories are empirical and not metaphysical systems.

An interesting, ironic, and dangerous insight here is how the statement "it does not occupy itself with probable truths", hearkens back to Plato's rejection of the observable world in favor of the supposedly perfect world of 'forms', where the forms of things were perfect, and the observed things simply imperfect copies. Pythagoras, Plato, and those who followed in their footsteps respected the realm of ideas (of deductive logic) far more than the realm of sense experience, observation, and experimentation (and induction).

This trend of thought, in its many mutations, has been a major fundamental opponent of a scientific/physicalist/positivist world-view, which relies heavily on induction.

Glimpsing the Unknowable

Saturday, February 27, 2010

There’s so much information out there ready to reveal itself, its syntax and semantics, ready to reveal a grand unified explanation of everything, both physical and metaphysical. And, I feel obliged to synthesize this information.

While any theory based on metaphysical assumptions can be dismissed as unverifiable, or failing to meet the scientific standard of falsifiability, metaphysical truths, if there are any, may possibly be determined by their physical effects, if any. Just in the way that the gravity of the Earth will have an effect on a person inside a windowless room from which they can’t leave, something outside the Universe, if possible and existent, may have an effect inside the Universe which can be observed or inferred from other effects which depend on it. Such may be the case with dark matter and dark energy. Of course, if possible, things may exist outside the Universe and have no such effect, or no things could exist outside the Universe, or, no things could possibly exist outside the Universe. None these options are falisifiable, and could be dismissed as easily as asserted. But, such assertions are commonly made, most often in the case of God, but also concerning other subjects such as the origin of the Universe, the dwelling place of other supernatural beings or of the dualist’s ‘mind’, or in conceptions of cosmic consciousness, universal will or ‘the world as will’, or an all prevalent force or forces which are common to all things in the Universe, and perhaps to the Universe itself. Some people might even go so far as to say these are all the same thing, and all of reality consists of various mutations, arrangements, or movements of it.

As said before, such an assertion could be dismissed as easily as it can be made, but many, if not all people base their ideas off of such metaphysical assertions, adopting them as interim truths or working hypotheses. It would be wise for people to choose those metaphysical assumptions that most easily allow for and fully agree with empirical reality. So, this is not an attempt to defend presumption, but rather an attempt to direct metaphysical thought such that it may be agreeable, provide some epistemic value, and furthermore to suggest how metaphysical propositions might actually be detected and supported through effects they may have in the observable world.